Mirza Raja Jai Singh and his Deccan Policy may be an interesting chapter of Mughal history but it was a question of life and death for Mirza Raja himself.
The Hindu ruler of Amber Mirza Raja Jai Singh (1621-1667) was contemporary to Mughal emperors Jahangir (1605-1627), Shahjahan (1628-1658) and Aurangzeb (1658-1707). All these three Mughal emperors wanted to annex Deccan in Mughal teritory.
Shahjahan and Aurangzeb sent forces against Maratha leader Chhatrapati Shivaji (1630-1680 A.D.) and Shiya rulers of Deccan.
To annex Mirza Raja Jai Singh wanted a permanent alliance between Shivaji and Mughals so that Jai Singh can win Shiya rulers of Deccan States. Shahjahan believed in Jai Singh’s policies but Aurangzeb was a cunning and shrewd emperor and he wanted to crush Chhatrapati Shivaji fist and then Shiya rulers of Deccan.
If Jai Singh’s proposals had been sincerely acted upon, the subsequent history of Aurangzeb’s reign may have been very different.
In order to understand the “revolutionary” nature of Jai Singh’s proposals it is necessary to analyze the main features of Mughal policy towards the Deccan till Jai Singh’s appointment in September 1664 to deal with Shivaji.
In order to safeguard Mughal communications with Gujrat and force the Deccan States to accept Mughal suzreignty, Akbar had conquered Khandesh and the northern part of Ahmadnagar and Berar, extending his territory almost to the mouth of the river Godavari.[1]
Jahangir maintained position in the face of recurrent wars waged by Ahmadnagar and the other Deccan States to recover its lost territories and push back the Mughal frontiers. Finally, Shahjahan decided that peace in the Deccan could be assured only by the extinction of Ahmadnagar. He, therefore, decided to win Bijapur over to his side by offering to partition with it the territories of Ahmadnagar. After many ups and downs, Bijapur accepted the proposals of Shah Jahan and accordingly, Ahmadnagar was partitioned between the two in 1636. This treaty stipulated for co-operation between Bijapur and the Mughal against the Marathas who, under Shahji, were trying to carve out a principality out of Ahmadnagar territories.
Shahjahan did not insist that Shahji be destroyed since he had powerful friends at the Bijapur court, but proposed that Shahji be taken in Bijapur service and be employed in the Karnatak. Simultaneously, he tried to limit Bijapur’s ambitions by taking Golconda under Mughal protection, and appointing himself the arbiter of the disputes between Bijapur and Golconda.[2]
This system secured the Mughals peace on their Deccan frontiers for a period of almost twenty years. The Viceroy of the Deccan in 1652, the situation had begun to change. But by the time Aurangzeb arrived as southward expansion of Bijapur and Golconda had practically doubled their territories. Even if we disregard the vague Mughal claims of suzreignty over the Deccani States, Mughal neutrality was a definite factor in the striking success of these States. The Mughals, therefore, beg an to look for excuses for putting forward claims for “compensation”.[3]
This, coupled with the personal ambitions of Aurangzeb created a new situation in the Deccan, and the “system” of 1636 beg an to dissolve rapidly.
The policies of Jai Singh must be viewed against the situation which developed after 1652, and particularly after the wars with Golconda and Bijapur in 1657-1658. The essential feature of these wars were the Mughal claims for territorial and monetary compensations. In the case of Golconda, Shahjahan wanted to take into his possession the eastern Karnatak an area as rich and extensive as Golconda which was the Jagir of Mir Jumla who had been taken into Mughal service. In Bijapur, Shahjahan demanded the cession of the Nizam Shahi areas ceded to it by him in 1636.
There was no disagreement on these points between Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb, though the latter had hoped for and advocated the conquest of entire Golconda and Bijapur.[4] But the opportunity was let slip, and Aurangzeb had to content himself with Ramgir fort in Golconda and parts of the old Nizam Shahi territories in Bijapur.
It might have been expected that after his accession to the throne, Aurangzeb might resume his policy of conquering Golconda and Bijapur. But he seems to have been diverted more and more towards the problem of In 1629, Shah Jahan, conscious of the importance of the Marathas. Marathas in the Deccan, had tried to win over many of their sardars to his side. although Shahji joined the Mughals at first, he had soon defected, and in alliance with Murari Pandit and other anti-Mughal elements at the Bijapuri court, had opposed the Mughals and tried to set up a new Nizam Shahi dynasty under the control of the Marathas.[5]
In 1657, Aurangzeb had again tried to win over Shivaji to his side, with little success. Shivaji had demanded the part of Dabhol, and the Adil Shahi (i.e. south Konkan) when the Mughals over-ran the Nizam Shahi (i.e. northern Konkan) and Balaghat.[6]
These terms were apparently considered excessive by Aurangzeb who had come to distrust Shivaji, and, like Shah Jahan, was opposed to the creation of a powerful Maratha State on the border of the Mughal Deccan. This is clearly shown by Aurangzeb’s nishan to Adil Shah on the eve of his departure to north India: “Protect this country, expel Shiva who has sneaked into the possession of some forts of this land. If you wish to entertain his services, give him jagirs in the Karnatak, far away from the Imperial dominions, so that he may not disturb them”;[7]
When Shaista Khan arrived in the Deccan as Viceroy in Sept. 1659, he found that Shivaji had become stronger th an ever. He had destroyed Afzal Khan and his army and over-run Panhala and south Konkan. Sidi Salab at who had been sent against him, had turned a traitor. The Adil Shah recovered Panhala, but he could not oust Shivaji from the ochir are as on account of the rebelion of Salab at Khan, and because he preferred to concentrate his energies for the conquest of the Karnatak.[8]
Aurangzeb now tried to copy Shah Jahan’s policy of inducing Bijapur to join hands with the Mughals against the Marathas. But what concessions could he offer to Bijapur for the purpose? The return of Nizam Shahi territories ceded by Bijapur to the Mughals in 1657 was unthinkable. and without any large concessions, Bijapur had no reason to join hands with the Mughals against Shivaji. Here was the fatal flaw in Aurangzeb’s Deccan policies which he could not resolve till the end.
The failure of Shaista Khan’s campaign against Shivaji from 1660 to 1664 when Bijapur was not prepared to co-operate with him, under-lined the need for a fresh approach to the Deccan politics. This was the situation when Jai Singh was appointed with plenipotentiary powers to deal with Shivaji. The first step of Jai Singh was to dangle before the Bijapur ruler the hope of their reduction of tribute and removal of the Emperor’s displeasure if he aided the Mughals and proved his want of connections with Shivaji. He also asked the Hindu Zamindars of Karnatak for help by threatening Bijapur from the south.[9]
But he knew that this would hardly bind Bijapur to the Mughals. The grand design that he gradually unfolded was to bind Shivaji to the Mughal cause by granting him large concessions at the cost of Bijapur (in the process shifting the bulk of his jagir away from the sensitive Mughal frontier), and utilizing his incomparable knowledge of the Deccan to overrun Bijapur. “The conquest of Bijapur was the prelude to the conquest of Karnatak and the Deccan.” Once Bijapur had been conquered, Shivaji would be at the mercy of the Mughals for they would then “hem him in like the centre of a circle.”[10]
This policy might appear to be Machiavellian, but it was based on certain sound principles and the reality of the situation. The essential belief of Jai Singh apparently was that the Marathas could not be controlled in the long run without the conquest of Bijapur and other parts of the Deccan. an intigral part of this was his idea that it was in the interests of the Mughals to conciliate and win over the Marathas because they formed the feuded-military aristocracy of the Deccan just like the Rajputs in north India.
It was quite obvious that it would not be easy for Jai Singh to convince Aurangzeb of such a startlingly new policy. The policy of the outright annexation of the Deccan would be a drastic reversal of the policy followed by the Mughals since the time of Akbar. The extent to which the Marathas could contribute towards it was also a question able issue.
Moreover, in view of Aurangzeb’s known orthodox views, his deep distrust of Shivaji and his intensely suspicious nature, Jai Singh had to tread with great caution in his advocacy of an alliance with Shivaji. Nor was his task rendered any easier by the hostility of Shaista Khan, Jaswant Singh, Jahanara Begum and others towards Shivaji whom they considered merely a petty land-holder (bhumia), and a bandit.
When exactly did Jai Singh conceive of an alliance with Shivaji against Bijapur? Although he had been instructed by Aurangzeb to punish both Adil Shah and Shivaji, he had told Aurangzeb that “it would not be wise to attack both these fools at the same time.” He had thus, first concentrated his effort against Shivaji.
As a shrewd politician, he knew that it would not be wise to drive Shivaji to extremities. While pressing him hard militarily, he seems to have kept a line open to him. It is possible that the project of an alliance against Bijapur was actually broached first by Shivaji. In his letters to Aurangzeb contained in the Haft Anjuman, which is our primary source of information, Jai Singh gives us the following background.
” After the arrival of the imperial army near Pabal, Shivaji’s agents began to visit me, and again upto my arrival at Poona they twice brought letters from him. But I gave no answer, and sent them back in disappointment. I knew that unless a strong hand was laid upon him, his words and stories would not contain a particle of truth.[11]
Mirza Raja Jai Singh does not tell us the nature of the proposals made by Shivaji at this juncture. A little later, Shivaji sent a long hindi letter with a trusted officer named Karmaji. The purport of the letter was that “if the Mughal Army turns to the invasion of Bijapur, such a course would be better than undergoing the many hardships (of campaigning) in this hilly region (i.e. Konkan) of difficult paths and stony soil.”[12]
Thus the idea of an alliance against Bijapur had been projected by Shivaji. But Jai Singh adhered to his policy of refusing to tre at Shivaji till he had succeeded in pressing him hard.
It was only when Shivaji had been hammed in at Purandar that Mirza Raja Jai Singh agreed to treat with him. He had found out in advance that if Shivaji could not obtain terms from the Mughals, he would restore a part of Bijapuri Tal-Konkan to the Sultan of Bijapur, join the latter and oppose the Mughals.
From trustworthy spies Mirza Raja Jai Singh had learnt that the Sultan of Bijapur while professing loyalty to the Emperor, had secretly promised Shivaji every possible help and was posting an army of his own in the Tal-Konkan, in order that the imperial force might not proceed thither. Hence, wrote Jai Singh, “it struck me that to render Shiva hopeless would only drive him intoAn alliance with Bijapur”.[13]
He tried to convince Aurangzeb that the mere capture of a few forts of Shivaji would not solve the problem, nay that even if Shivaji was captured or killed, the Marathas would have continued to resist the Mughals.
It is not necessary for us to analyse in detail the terms of the treaty of Purandor. As Sarkar says “the treaty was really an agreement between the Mughals and the Marathas for the partition of the Bijapuri kingdom between them.”[14]
Shivaji surrendered 23 out of his 35 forts in the old Nizam Shahi territories leaving him an income of only one lakh hun out of five lakhs. In return for this, his title to territory worth 4 lakh huns of Bijapuri Tal-Konkan which he already held would be recognized and he was granted territory worth five lakh huns in Bijapuri Balaghat.
Thus, Mirza Raja Jai Singh gained two advantages, he deprived Shivaji most of his territory on the sensitive Mughal frontier and he threw a bone of contention between Shivaji and Bijapur.
Aurangzeb accepted the proposals of Mirza Raja Jai Singh outwardly, but it active alliance of the Mughals with Shivaji. He wrote to Jai Singh, “Bijapuri Tal-Konk an is granted to Shiva, but no order will be issued by me about Bijapuri Balagh at being given to him. If he can take it, by him wrest it from Adil Shah.”[15]
From the letters between Kunwar Ram Singh and Mirza Raja Jai Singh, contained in the Rajasthan State archives, it is apparent that Aurangzeb was not alone in opposing an active alliance between Shivaji and the Mughals with Jai Singh as a check upon him, said to Jai Singh, “Maharajah! Don’t invade Bijapur. You have conquered Shiva, let him manage things in the Deccan and conduct our business there.” Some of Jai Singh’s ardars, Sur Singh and Bhojraj also echoed Diler Khan’s views.[16]
It might have been more prudent on the part of Mirza Raja Jai Singh to remain content with his success against Shivaji and bask in the favour of his royal master. But he knew that a campaign against Bijapur was a sine quo non of a durable alliance with Shivaji. If Shivaji was left alone to fend against Bijapur after losing four-fifth of his territory in the Mughal dominions, he could hardly have been enthusiastic in the Mughal cause. between Shivaji and Bijapur was not imposible.
As Jai Singh explained a fresh alliance to Aurangzeb, Bijapur had offered to cede territory worth five lakh huns in the Bijapur Balagh at if Shivaji allowed his brother to join the service of Bijapuri.[17]
Thus, the alliance with Shivaji was an integral part of the larger project conceived by Jai Singh, and one could not be detached from the other.
It may be conceded that Jai Singh was led by the will of the wisp of the success of his grand design. Aurangzeb had agreed to the campaign against Bijapur only grudgingly, without giving Jai Singh adequate forces ford the purpose[18]. Jai Singh had therefore to depend upon the forces placed at his disposal for the campaign against Shivaji, the forces of the Viceroy of the Deccan and his own personal resources.[19] Shivaji, the utmost that Aurangzeb conceded was that he was allotted mahals yielding five lakh of hun in Bijapuri Balagh at “subject to the o Even in the case of condition that you conquer them before my (projected) campaign against Bijapur”.[20]
There is little doubt that Jai Singh seriously underestimated the difficulty of conquering Bijapur. His hope of surprising Bijapur was illusory and Aurangzeb had neither sanctioned the siege of Bijapur nor provided any war materials for the purpose. Golconda, too, rallied to the cause of Bijapur, and sent a force of 12,000 sawars and 40,000 foot under Nek Nam Khan to help Bijapur.[21]
As soon as Jai Singh received A set back, Dilir Khan and the faction hostile to Shivaji “ascribed his ill-success to the luke warmness or treachery of Shivaji and demanded that he should be imprisoned as a punishment”.[22]
Jai Singh sent Shivaji out of harm’s way by deputing him to invest Panhala, but Shivaji’s failure before the fort and the defection of his right hand man, Netaji, to the Bijapuris gave a further set back to Jai Singh’s policy. Dilir Khan was inveighing against the costly war and Aurangzeb too was getting impatient. Hence, desperately casting about for an expedient, Jai Singh thought of sending Shivaji to the court.
There is a consider able debate about Shivaji’s motive of going to the Court. But another equally important question is: what did Jai Singh hope to achieve by it. at the very minimum, he wanted to remove Shivaji from harm’s way and place him out of the reach of Dilir Khan. But more positively, he hoped that Aurangzeb would befriend Shivaji, and that this would induce Aurangzeb to send further military resources to the Deccan to en able Jai Singh to pursue his grand enterprise, or that he might even come to the Deccan, himself. ashe wrote to Aurangzeb, “Now thatAdil Shah and Qutb Shah have united in mischief, it is bi Shiva’s necessary to win heart by all means.[23]
But Aurangzeb’s it unsympathetic attitude to Shivaji, the fiasco of Shivaji visit to agra and his subsequent imprisonment came as a heavy blow to Jai Singh. All his years of careful planning, his earnest pleadings with Aurangzeb, his arduous campaigning in inhospitable are as and his squandering of his personal treasures in order to subdue the Deccan, all seemed to go up in smoke. There is little doubt that by his attitude Aurangzeb lost a golden opportunity of befriending the redoubt able Maratha chief. But Aurangzeb too found himself in a perplexity. On the one hand, he did realise the importance of Shivaji, but at the same time, he could not disregard the loud outcry of Jahanara, Jaswant Singh, the wazir Jafar Khan and others that if a petty “Bhumia” could be allowed to behave in this insolent manner, how could Imperial dignity be preserved? at first, Aurangzeb veered to the side of the latter party, and ordered Shivaji to proceed to Kabul which,According to Kr. Ram Singh, meant that he had decided to have him killed on the way.[24]
But at the insistence of Kr. Ram Singh that his father had promisedA safe conduct to Shivaji,And at the instance of M. Amin Khan the Mir Bakhshi (who had accepted a bribe from Shivaji), Aurangzeb changed his mind after a couple of days. The posting to Kabul was cancelled, Shivaji was entrusted to Kr. Ram Singh and Sidi Faulad, and Jai Singh was written to asto what promises he had made to Shivaji.[25]
Things had happened very differently from what Jai Singh had hoped. His first concern was the safety of Shivaji, particularly as he knew that as at the time of his visit at Purandar, Shivaji had made all arrangements for the running of his administration in the case of his imprisonment or death. His second concern was the salvaging of his project of the Deccan could be brought under control only if the Emperor came there quest of the Deccan. In the changed situation, Jai Singh emphasised that personally. In the meanwhile, he said, Shiva should be left in a proper style (i.e. not as a prisoner) so that his officers may not despair of his return and go over to Adil Shah. Shiva should be conciliated and assured, and after the Emperor reached the Deccan, he should be summoned there fromAgra.[26]
Jai Singh had served in the Deccan under Shah Jahan, and he had seen that in 1629, and again in 1635, it was only due to the personal pre-sense of the Emperor that the efforts of the Imperial officers could be co-ordinated and sufficient resources made available for success in the Deccan. His grand strategy of the conquest of the Deccan and alliance with the Marathas could only be implemented if Aurangzeb genuinely accepted it and was prepared, to make the necessary efforts, and provide the resources to implement it. But as we have seen, Aurangzeb had reservations of the feasibility and desirability of an active alliance with Shivaji and consented to Jai Singh’s invasion of Bijapur with reluctance. In the view of the Persian threat and Yusufzai uprising, Aurangzeb put off indefinitely the idea of proceeding to the Deccan in accordance with Jai Singh’s suggestions. He also asked Shivaji to surrender allhis forts. The prospect for Shivaji was now an indefinite imprisonment. The final escape of Shivaji from agra set a seal on the failure of Jai Singh’s policies. Aurangzeb ordered Jai Singh to proceed to Kabul from the Deccan and appointed Prince Muazzam as Viceroy of the Deccan, thus signaling an end to the hostilities with Bijapur.
Sarkar says “Jai Singh’s invasion of Bijapur was a military failure. Not an inch of territory, notA stone of fortress, nor a pice of indemnity was gained by it”.[27] The vindication of Jai Singh consists not only of the 18 months of siege of Bijapur conducted by Aurangzeb 19 years later when Bijapur was for weaker and in an advanced state of dissolution but of the prolonged operations against the Marathas which the Mughals had to endure subsequently and which forced Aurangzeb to remain in the Deccan to the end of his days.
The key-note of Jai Singh’s Deccan policy was his advocacy of a forward policy in the Deccan in alliance with the Marathas. Aurangzeb, it seems, never fully grasped the importance of the Marathas and particularly of Shivaji in the Deccan. His highest concept was to try to embroil Shivaji with Bijapur leaving most of his Poona Jagir in the hands of the Mughals. after Shivajis flight from Agra, Aurangzeb told Shivaji’s wakil that “his (Shiva’s) offences were pardoned, at hish son had been enrolledAsA mansabdar and that he was at liberty to seize asmuch of Bijapur territory ashe could.”[28]
This was the same policy that Aurangzeb, Dilir Khan etc. hadAdvocated after the Treaty of Purandar and which Jai Singh had vehemently opposed. Aurangzeb forgot that two could play at the same game, and that Bijapur, too, could offer induce- ments to Shivaji to turn against the Mughals.[29]
The only way of control- ling Shivaji and consolidating the alliance with him was, asJai Singh had foreseen, a forward policy against Bijapur.
After the death of Jai Singh, Mughal policy in the Deccan floundered on without any clear concepts. Neither the attempt to destroy Shivaji with the help of Bijapur (1672-76), nor the attempt to conquer the Deccani States in disregard of the Marathas (1676-79) could succeed, while Maratha strength grew all the time. Finally, Aurangzeb launched upon the enterprise of destroying both the Deccani States and the Marathas together. The results of this are well known to the students of history.
We may thus conclude that Jai Singh was not only an able diplomat but a statesman with A r are insight into things. The policies that he advocated in the Deccan were not only hold in concept but if they had been sincerely accepted and implemented, may have saved the Mughal empire from the deep-seated political crisis into which it became progressively engulfed within a decade of the Mirza Raja’s death.
REFERENCES
[1] Map reproduced by Irfan Habib, Agrarian System of Mughal India.
[2] Lahauri, Badshah Nama, I b/167-174, 178-180.
Bijapur was asked not to interfere with Golconda. It was also stipulated in the treaty with Golconda that if the Adit Khanis invaded Golconda, the Viceroy of the Deccan would help the Qutb Shah. If in spite of request for help, the Imperialists were lex in doing so, any money paid by Golconda to Bijapur would be set off against the peshkash due to the Mughal Emepror.
[3] See Sarkar, Aurangzeb, ii; J. N. Sarkar, Life of Mir Jumla, pp. 62-77 (intrigues with Mir Jumla).
[4] Sarkar, Aurangzeb, ii.
[5] Lahauri, Badshah Nama, ii p. 36; Basatin-us-Salatin, 1.0.3406, pp. 509, 512.
[6] Adab-i-Alamgiri, ff. 156 b, 157A.
Letter d. 24 Feb., 1658; tr. by Sarkar, House of Shivaji, pp. 95-97. These terms were granted to Shivaji on the eve of Aurangzeb’s departure to north India. Earlier, Aurangzeb had agreed to a formal recognition of Shivaji’s right to all Bijapuri forts and villages actually in his possession and the port of Dabbal and the territory pertaining to it (Shivaji 48-49). These were apparently not all the demands put forward by Shivaji, the question of Konk an having remained unresolved.
[7] Adab 163A; Sarkar Shivaji and His Times, 4th ed., pp. 53-54.
[8] Tarikh-i-AliAdil Shah II, x;Add, 26, 268, 76 b-80A et seg.
[9] Shivaji, 102-107.
[10] Haft Anjuman, Mirza Raja Jai Singh to Aurangzeb, June 1665, tr Sarkar, House of Shivaji, p. 113.
Thus, see emphasis of the author of the Basatin that both these kafirs had made A joint pact to disturb Bijapur (I. O. p; 606).
[11] House of Shivaji, p. 104.
[12] Ibid.,
[13] Ibid, p. 107.
[14] Sarkar, House of Shivaji, p. 102.
[15] Haft Anjuman, Baner as MS. in Sarkar’s Collection, ff. 70A-b.
[16] R.S.A., Parkaldas to Kalyandas, d. 18th July, 1666; Shivaji’s visit to Aurangzeb at Agra, Poona, 1963, p. 39.
[17] Haft Anjuman, 70A-b.
[18] Sarkar, Aurangzeb, IV, 145-146.
[19] Basatin places the forces of Jai Singh at 80,000 horses and like foot which is fantastic (I. O., 3406, pp. 606-7).
[20] Farman to Shivaji d. 5 Ravi I yr. 8/5th Sept. 1665, tr. House of Shivaji, p. 126.
[21] T:Ali Adil Shah, ff. 170 b-171A.
[22] Shivaji, 129.
[23] Haft Anjuman, 94A, Shivaji, 131.
[24] Parkaldas to Kalyand as 16th May, 1666; Shivaji’s Visit, pp. 27-29.
[25] Shivaji’s Visit, Rajasthani Letters No. 18, 19, 20.
[26] Haft Anjuman 194A, 179A; Shivaji’s Vivit, 36-37; Shivaji, 147.
[27] Sarkar, Aurangzeb, IV, 144.
[28] Akhbar at 6th May 1667; House of Shivaji, p. 153; Shivaji’s Visit, p. 65 Subsequently Sambhaji’s mansab was raised to 6000/6000 (5000 du-aspab sih-aspab) and 280 lakh dam inama belated recognition of the low mansab accorded to Shivaji at the time of his visit. (Dilir to Shivaji, early March 1668 Shivaji’s Visit, p. 67). Shivaji had written a petition and submitted it through Muhammad Amin Khan ashis mediator, in which he stated, “If your Majesty restores to me all the forts taken by you, I shall pay two crores of rupees.” (Parkaldas to Kalyand as 29th May 1666, Shivaji’s Visit, Rajasthani Letter No. 21). The suggestion had been scornfully rejected by Aurangzeb, but it shows the direction in which Shivaji’s mind was moving.
[29] Dr. Satish Chandra, Deccan Policy Of Mirza Raja Jai Singh A Reappraisal, Rajasthan History Congress, 1968, pp. 76-84.
